A Note on Tax Shelters
Marvin Chirelstein and Lawrence Zelenak
This article describes the ongoing legislative and administrative efforts to curtail tax
shelters. It concludes that these efforts, which rely largely on disclosure requirements and
penalties, cannot succeed as long as taxpayers continue to win many of the litigated shelter
cases. It also concludes that the recent proposal of the Joint Committee on Taxation, to codify
the economic substance doctrine, is unlikely to solve the problem. Although the proposal would
have the salutary effect of preventing courts from deciding that the economic substance doctrine
does not exist, courts would remain free to conclude that the doctrine is not applicable in
particular situations, or to find that the doctrine is satisfied in highly dubious circumstances.
Narrowly tailored legislative responses to particular types of shelters are also not adequate as a
solution to the overall shelter problem; since the legislative fixes are prospective only, taxpayers
merely move on to new types of shelters not yet legislated against. Accordingly, the article
suggests a new approach to the shelter problem, based on the general disallowance of noneconomic losses. This could be accomplished by either (1) the enactment of a Code provision
flatly disallowing noneconomic losses, subject to an exception for noneconomic losses the
deduction of which is clearly contemplated by Congress, or (2) a legislative grant of authority to
the Treasury to promulgate regulations retroactively disallowing noneconomic losses, as
necessary to prevent abuse.

The marketing of tax shelters by leading accounting and investment banking firms has
developed into a perfect plague over the past decade. The aim in every case is to create a tax
benefit in the form of a loss, expense or exclusion from gross income that has no economic
corollary but is simply the consequence, or the hoped-for consequence, of rule manipulation. It
is beyond doubt that such manipulations are contrary to Congressional intent, but that perception
has not always been conclusive or even probative in the cases that have arisen.
Recent litigation between taxpayers and the government has had mixed results, with
taxpayers winning in more than a few instances by persuading the courts that ‘rules are rules’1
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See, e.g., IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); Compaq
Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United
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and that Congress alone, but not the courts, must patch the leaky tire if Congress thinks a patch
is needed. To be sure, the government has also had some major victories.2
From the taxpayer’s standpoint there is little to lose (apart from fees to the promoter) by
investing in a tax-shelter scheme provided that the only consequence, if the scheme unravels, is
payment of taxes that would have had to be paid anyway. So why not give it a try? The outlook
would be a lot more chancy – often prohibitively so – if the taxpayer also had to confront the risk
of civil penalties for understating his income, penalties that might, depending on circumstances,
run as high as 75% of the tax due.3 In many cases, probably most, that danger would render the
tax-shelter scheme unsalable. The solution to this irritating problem has been for the tax-shelter
promoter to obtain and furnish to the taxpayer (at the taxpayer’s expense) an opinion of
independent tax counsel whose considered conclusions on the legal status of the tax-shelter are
presumably entitled to respect. Usually running to forty or fifty pages of heavily cited legal
analysis, such opinions almost invariably state that in the event of a challenge by the government
the taxpayer’s position is “more likely than not” to be upheld by the courts. The phrase “more
likely than not” apparently means that there is at least a 51% chance of success in any future
litigation, although, to be sure, by implication, there may also be a 49% chance of failure. But
the effect of such an opinion – or so it is hoped – is to immunize the taxpayer from the danger of
civil fraud penalties. If unlucky enough to be audited, the taxpayer can honestly assert that he
sought the opinion of reputable counsel and was assured thereby that the tax-shelter scheme was
consistent with the requirements of law.4
States, 342 F.Supp.2d 94 (D. Conn. 2004); Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F.Supp.
621 (N.D. Md. 2004); and Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed.Cl. 716 (2004).
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See, e.g., ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
526 U.S. 1017 (1999); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002); ASA Investerings Partnership v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505
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The 75% penalty is imposed on underpayments attributable to fraud. IRC § 6663.
Section 6662 imposes a 20% penalty on an underpayment attributable to “any substantial
understatement of tax,” and section 6662A (added to the Code in 2004) imposes a 20% penalty
on understatements of tax attributable to “listed” and “reportable” tax shelter transactions (with
the penalty increased to 30% if the taxpayer did not adequately disclose the transaction on its
return).
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A “should” opinion is even better – at least it should be. “Tax law practitioners
customarily use the wording of a legal opinion to convey their level of comfort that the legal
conclusions contained therein are correct... Different comfort levels are customarily indicated
with the language “more likely than not,” “should,” and “will.” A “should” level opinion
evinces a fairly high level of comfort that the legal conclusions follow as a matter of law from
the factual representations and assumptions.” Long Term Capital Holdings, supra note 2, at 144.
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Some high-standing law firms have steadily declined to furnish such opinions; others,
with bills to pay, have not.
The Treasury’s very limited audit resources have made it difficult for the government to
track tax shelter transactions, a problem to which Congress reacted in 2004 by adopting strict
disclosure requirements buttressed by substantial penalties for non-compliance. The penalty
provisions are aimed both at the taxpayer and at his or its ‘material advisors,’ the latter
presumably including the firm or firms that act to implement the shelter plan.5
But disclosure is not a solution. As noted, the government has lost at least as many
audited tax shelter cases as it has won. To date, Congress has been unable to formulate a
substantive rule that would define “tax shelter” and simply deny the purported tax benefit in
cases that come within that definition. Adoption of a statutory “economic substance” rule has
been proposed and discussed at great length,6 but the tax bar has generally opposed that step on
the ground that such a rule would throw doubt on legitimately planned transactions and create
uncertainty where none exists or should exist.7

The taxpayers in Long Term paid their tax advisors $500,000 for a set of “should” opinions
(“more likely than not” opinions would presumably have cost less) but got socked with heavy
civil penalties anyway.
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Section 6707A penalizes taxpayers who fail to include on their returns information
required information with respect to “listed” and “reportable” tax shelter transactions. For
corporate taxpayers the penalty is $200,000 for each undisclosed listed transaction, and $50,000
for each reportable (but unlisted) transaction. For human beings, the penalty amounts are
$100,000 and $10,000, respectively. Section 6111 requires tax shelter promoters to file
information returns identifying and describing their tax shelters. There is a $50,000 penalty for
each failure to comply with § 6111. The penalty is increased to the greater of $200,000 or 50%
of the promoter’s gross income derived from the shelter, in the case of listed transactions. Also,
§6662A (supra, note 3) imposes a higher penalty on tax shelter understatements of tax liability in
the case of undisclosed transactions. In a related regulatory development, in December 2004
Treasury amended its rules governing practice before the IRS, to impose stricter requirements on
the writers of tax shelter opinion letters. Among other things, writers of opinion letters may not
base their opinions on unreasonable factual assumptions or representations, and must make
reasonable efforts to ascertain all relevant facts. Circular 230, 31 CFR § 10.35.
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The leading current proposal, which is discussed later in this essay, comes from the Staff
of the Joint Committee on Taxation. Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Options to
Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures 14-30 (JCS-02-05, 2005).
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Our aim in this brief Note is to propose a straightforward and (as we think)
uncomplicated statutory solution to the tax shelter problem, one that avoids the much-disputed
‘economic substance’ doctrine and that entails no intrusion on what practitioners would
generally regard as legitimate and traditional tax planning. We offer a ‘model’ Code provision,
together with Commentary, in our Appendix. This is discussed against the background of a
current proposal by the Joint Committee on Taxation, which we think deficient in vital respects.
Hoping that non-specialists will find the topic accessible, we begin with an illustration of
a shelter device taken from a recent decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
An Illustration
Tax shelter arrangements are inevitably complex and detailed – often by design. The
fairly recent ACM Partnership case8 is a very suitable illustration of the species, one that nonspecialists (we hope) can follow easily (or fairly easily). By way of background, the Internal
Revenue Code has for many years contained an installment sale rule allowing sellers of
investment property to report their gains in the years in which the installment payments are
received rather than all at once at the date of sale. Assuming the amount of each installment
payment is prescribed by the contract of sale, the seller simply allocates a portion of his cost to
each payment in proportionate fashion. Perfectly simple. But suppose the installment payments
are contingent on future events, so that the amounts to be received each year cannot be
ascertained or even predicted at the time the sale takes place. At what rate should the seller’s
cost be recovered? In the well-known (to tax practitioners) Logan case,9 the transaction involved
the sale of a coal mine in exchange for royalty payments calculated with respect to the tonnage
of coal to be mined each year. Finding that the present value of the royalty payments could not
be ascertained, the Supreme Court took the easy way out by holding that the seller was entitled
to recover her entire cost before reporting any gain from the sale. The effect was to defer the
recognition of taxable gain well into the future, such deferral obviously being very much to the
taxpayer’s advantage.
Dissatisfied with the result in Logan, Congress in 1980 authorized the Treasury to
substitute ratable cost-recovery rules for the ‘front end’ cost-recovery procedure approved by the
Court in Logan. Accordingly, in a case in which the payout period is fixed but the maximum
amount to be paid is uncertain, the Regulations now require that the seller’s cost be allocated in
equal amounts over the stated payment period.10 The result, presumably, is that the seller’s gain
will be computed on a yearly basis instead of being deferred, with any unrecovered cost to be
deducted in the year in which all payments are completed.
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As described, the ratable cost-recovery rule seems a reasonable solution to the awkward
contingent payment problem posed by the Logan case. But what the cited Regulations failed to
anticipate was that so-called tax-planners would treat that rule as an invitation to create an
avoidance scheme of the most egregious and transparent character. In the ACM Partnership
case, the tax planning was done by one of the nation’s great financial institutions – Merrill
Lynch, no less – and the taxpayer to which the avoidance scheme was sold was a major
consumer products company, Colgate-Palmolive, maker of soap and toothpaste and other articles
of personal hygiene.
Colgate had earlier realized a large taxable gain on the sale of a subsidiary. The object of
the tax plan was to create a deductible “loss” that could be carried back and offset against that
gain,11 thus eliminating the tax otherwise due.
Briefly described (rounding all the numbers and omitting many details), the plan went
like this:
1. Colgate and Merrill entered into an offshore partnership with a Dutch bank, Algemene
Bank Nederland, to which the parties made the following capital contributions (in millions):
Partnership Interest
80%
19%
1%
100%

Capital Investment
Dutch Bank $140
Colgate
33
Merrill Lynch
2
Totals $175

2. In the same year, the partnership
(A) bought $175 of notes issued by Citicorp, and then immediately
(B) sold the Citicorp notes to other investors, receiving from the latter
(i) $140 in cash, plus
(ii) Installment notes payable quarterly over the 5-year period following.
The dollar amount of each quarterly payment was not fixed, but would vary from quarter to
quarter depending on the prevailing interest rate for short-term interbank loans – the so-called
London Interbank Offering Rate, or LIBOR – a rate that changes slightly from day to day to
reflect loan demand and other market conditions. Overall the notes were expected to generate
$35, but it could be a little more or it could be a little less depending on LIBOR over the 5-year
term of the notes.
3. Shortly thereafter, the Dutch Bank received a cash distribution from the partnership
equal to its original capital investment – $140 – and was eliminated as a partner. Merrill Lynch
also got back all but a few hundred thousand of its original capital investment. This left Colgate
with a 99% interest in the partnership and Merrill Lynch with a 1% interest.
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. IRC § 1212(a).
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4. In the next year, the LIBOR notes were sold by the partnership for roughly $35 in
cash, following which the partnership in effect distributed virtually all of its assets to Colgate
and Merrill, the sole remaining partners. Colgate got back just about the same amount it put in
(less, of course, large fees paid to Merrill and the Dutch Bank), which is exactly what it
expected.
Pointless? Completely – except for the anticipated tax consequences. The partnership
treated the sale of the Citicorp notes as a contingent installment sale within the anti-Logan
Regulations – the “contingency” being the quarterly fluctuations in LIBOR during the 5-year
payout period. By reason of such fluctuations the payments to be received by the partnership
would vary from quarter to quarter. Hence the total amount to be received over the entire 6-year
period – the year of sale and the next 5 years – was uncertain, i.e., “contingent” on the LIBOR
from time to time prevailing.
Assuming (as the tax-planners intended) that the contingent installment sale rules
applied, the partnership’s basis for the Citicorp notes would be recoverable ratably over the 6year period in equal amounts of $29.167 a year, i.e., $175 (cost of the Citicorp notes) divided by
6 years equals $29.167. In the year of sale, therefore, the partnership had a gain of $140 (cash
received) less $29.167, or about $111. Only 19% of that gain, about $20, was allocated to
Colgate by reason of its 19% interest in the partnership, and $1 to Merrill Lynch. The
remainder, roughly $90, was allocated to the Dutch Bank, which, being a foreign entity, paid no
taxes to the United States.
In the following year when the LIBOR notes were sold, the partnership – now consisting
of Colgate 99% and Merrill Lynch 1% – offset its entire remaining basis, about $146 ($175 $29.167), against the sale price of $35. The result was a “loss” of about $111, of which 99%, or
$110, was allocable to Colgate (and $1 to Merrill). Taking into account the $20 of gain that it
realized in the first year when the cash payment of $140 was received, Colgate had a net
deductible loss of $110 minus $20 equals $90 (million) to carry back against the taxable gain
previously realized on the sale of its subsidiary. The “loss”, of course, was solely a function of
the ratable cost-recovery rule, not of any actual market disaster.
In summary, the Dutch Bank gained $90 and Colgate lost $90. In fact, neither “partner”
gained or lost anything. Same for Merrill Lynch.
Too good to be true? Yes, but just barely. Affirming the Tax Court, the Third Circuit in
a 2-1 decision disallowed Colgate’s purported $110 million loss (and eliminated its earlier $20
million gain). The overall partnership arrangement – and in particular, the purchase and
immediate resale of the Citicorp notes – lacked “economic substance,” in the Court’s view, and
as a consequence, under settled law, must be disregarded for tax purposes. “In order to be
deductible,” the Court observed, “a loss must reflect actual economic consequences sustained in
an economically substantive transaction and cannot result solely from the application of a tax
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accounting rule....”12 The dissenting judge argued, more or less typically, that the loophole, if
there was one, should be left for Congress to close.13
The majority opinion in ACM bears a close resemblance to the 1960 Knetsch decision, in
which the Supreme Court disallowed phantom interest deductions under a sham annuity
contract.14 There, as here, the absence of an economic or commercial purpose apart from taxsaving was fatal to the scheme. Undeterred, Colgate’s tax-planners thought it worthwhile to try
the sham-transaction game again, largely in the hope of baffling the courts and the Service or
(better yet) getting by without an audit. And they nearly did, losing a split decision by the luck
of the judicial draw.
What all this shows is that despite decades of legislative, judicial and administrative
effort to defend the system, the impulse to vandalize it remains alive and active in the minds of
those for whom the income tax is an object of evasion and nothing else.
The Joint Committee Proposal
The ACM Partnership decision represented something of a high point in the
government’s war against tax shelters and indeed led some commentators to suggest that the war
had been won and that tax shelters, like smallpox, were a thing of the past. Writing in 2001,
when the government’s appellate victory in ACM appeared to be the defining corporate tax
shelter decision, one experienced commentator confidently predicted that “[l]oss-generating
shelters will almost always fail in litigation.”15 Events, as it turned out, speedily proved the
prediction wrong. By the end of 2001, the government’s twin appellate defeats in Compaq and
IES had called that confidence into question,16 and three high-profile government defeats in
2004–Black & Decker, Coltec, and TIFD III-E17-- suggest it may be more likely that taxpayers
will win the great majority of litigated cases than that the government will do so. Not only are
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the courts finding the economic substance doctrine to be surprisingly easy to satisfy,18 there are
even rumblings that the courts may deny the very existence of the doctrine. According to the
Court of Federal Claims in Coltec, “{W]here a taxpayer has satisfied all statutory requirements
established by Congress . . . the use of the ‘economic substance’ doctrine to trump ‘mere
compliance with the Code’ would violate the separation of powers.”19 In support of this
proposition, the court cites (among many other things) the Supreme Court’s 2000 dictum in
Gitlitz v. Commissioner, in which the Court held that a result purportedly called for by the “plain
text” of the Code was inescapable despite its apparent conflict with Congressional intent. 20
Although Gitlitz was not a tax shelter case, and the economic substance doctrine was not
discussed in the opinion, when eight justices are so ready to accept unintended and illogical
results because of poor statutory drafting, an eventual rejection of the economic substance
doctrine by the Supreme Court is not unthinkable.
The 2004 legislative response to corporate tax shelters, with its focus on disclosure and
penalties, was based on the assumption that the real problem with shelters is the audit lottery. If
the taxpayer believes that a shelter is unlikely to survive litigation, then there is some
combination of increased odds of detection and increased penalties that will persuade the
taxpayer not to undertake the shelter. Obviously, even certainty of detection and massive
penalties for shelter-generated understatements of tax liability will not deter shelter activity if the
shelters will prevail on the merits in court.
In response to the new judicial coolness to the economic substance doctrine, there has
been growing legislative interest in codifying the doctrine. In a recent publication, the Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) has proposed a Code amendment that attempts to tackle
the shelter problem in express terms.21 Briefly summarized, the JCT amendment seeks to define
the several circumstances in which a court may apply the “economic substance” test, and then
undertakes to state what that test shall consist of. As a first step, the court must determine that
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A striking example, comes from the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in IES. A crucial issue
under the judge-made economic substance doctrine is whether a transaction featured a
reasonable prospect of being profitable, apart from tax benefits. The transaction in IES clearly
offered no hope of significant profit aside from hoped-for United States income tax benefits.
The Eighth Circuit decided, however, that the imposition of a foreign tax should be disregarded
in analyzing the transaction’s profit potential, and with the foreign tax disregarded the
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the “economic substance doctrine is relevant” in respect to an “applicable transaction.”22 If
“relevant,” the requirement of economic substance is to be deemed satisfied by the taxpayer only
if (A) the transaction changes the taxpayer’s economic position “in a meaningful way” apart
from tax saving, and (B) the taxpayer has a “substantial nontax purpose” for entering into the
transaction.23 The two criteria are in the conjunctive, meaning that the taxpayer fails the
“economic purpose” test (assuming that test is “relevant”) unless he satisfies both criteria.
There follows a list of six “applicable transactions.”24 The listing is ingeniously designed
to cover the known tax shelter universe not by describing tax shelter transactions in all their
particular detail, as might be done in a discursive revenue ruling, but by reference to the
mechanisms by which shelter devices customarily operate. For example, “applicable
transactions” include “[a] transaction which is structured to result in a disparity between basis
and fair market value which creates or increases a loss or reduces a gain,” a description that fits
the ACM case described above. And since tax shelters usually entail a chain of legal moves
designed to create the desired tax benefit, the JCT proposal wisely provides that “[t}he term
‘transaction’ includes a series of transactions.”25 Presumably the reference is to a”series” of
steps that are integrated or pre-wired and that are properly evaluated in their entirety.
In our view, though it is well-crafted and well-intended, the JCT proposal fails to
address the major problem in the shelter field, which is, quite simply, the ambiguous and
untrustworthy application of the ‘economic substance’ doctrine. The proposal says nothing
about what it takes to cross the threshold of ‘relevance’, and indeed in the accompanying
Discussion the JCT writers take pains to affirm that there is no intention to intrude on judicial
discretion:
“The proposal only applies to cases in which a court determines that
the economic substance doctrine is relevant. The proposal is not intended to
change current law standards used by the courts in determining when to utilize
an economic substance analysis, and does not require a court to make such a
determination merely because of the presence of an applicable transaction.
The proposal does not apply to cases in which the taxpayer establishes that the
outcome of the transaction is clearly consistent with all applicable provisions
of the Code and the purposes of such provision.”
The limitations or restrictions on the proposed statutory provision are thus expressed in
rather urgent terms. We presume the aim is to assure that the economic substance doctrine will
22
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not be extended improperly, whatever that means, or used in an excessively aggressive fashion
by the Internal Revenue Service. Perhaps such caution is unavoidable. The consequence,
however, may be to leave the doctrine in an uncertain status, vulnerable to chance judicial
interpretation very much as it is today. Our guess – admittedly only a guess – is that the results
reached by the courts over the past year or two, including the dissenting opinion in the ACM
case, would be unchanged by adoption of the JCT proposal. In effect, the ‘relevance’ limitation
frees the courts, at least those that are so disposed, to apply ‘rules’ in literal fashion, with the
usual proviso that rules are made to be followed until Congress acts to change them.
A related observation on the JCT proposal is in order. Assuming ‘relevance,’ tax
planners may be able to satisfy the proposed two-part test of economic substance by including
some opportunity for gain in the shelter arrangement, even though the chance of such gain is
small. The fact is that virtually every shelter arrangement does include an element of
prospective gain, however unlikely. In the ACM case, described above, a sharp drop in the
LIBOR would of course result in a sharp rise in the value of Colgate’s 5-year installment notes,
leading to an investment gain as well as a tax benefit. In the offsetting currency option shelter
cited below26, a quick and unexpected change in the value of the dollar, yen or euro could
likewise generate an investment gain for the taxpayer. The chance of gain is, as stated, remote
in every case, and the odds against are much longer than the promised payoff should the gamble
unexpectedly prove to be a winner. The bet is one that no sane and sensible investor would
make apart from the hoped-for tax saving, but “success” is not quite out of the question.
How do the JCT “meaningful change” and “substantial nontax purpose” tests operate
under these circumstances? Hard to say. The ‘meaningful change’ test, which is based on the
objective economic facts of the arrangement rather than the taxpayer’s subjective intent, may
well be satisfied. Making a bet, even a bad one, would seem to effect a meaningful change in the
taxpayer’s financial circumstances. But even if able to satisfy the objective part of the twofold
“economic substance” test, the taxpayer still confronts the subjective prong of the JCT criteria
and a court may find that no serious investor, with large sums at stake, would make as bad a bet
as this one. On the other hand, bad bets are made every day. And what if the taxpayer, pointing
to the possible gain, states simply that “he felt lucky that day,” long odds and short payoff
notwithstanding? Is that enough to satisfy the nontax business purpose test? It is if the court
believes him (i.e., falls for it), and some courts probably will. No doubt a similar argument was
made in the ACM case. It lost, to be sure, but only by a 2-1 vote.
In summary, although codification would prevent a court from concluding that the
doctrine does not exist, courts would remain free to conclude that the doctrine is not relevant in
particular situations. And even when they did find the doctrine relevant, courts would remain
free to find meaningful changes in economic positions and substantial nontax purposes in highly
dubious circumstances. In only one of the recent government litigation losses did the court
question the existence of the doctrine (and even in that case the court held that, assuming the
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Infra, note 67.
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doctrine did exist, it was satisfied on the facts of the case27). In all the other cases, the courts
found that the doctrine did indeed exist, and was relevant, but that the tax shelters in question
actually passed the doctrinal test.
If disclosure requirements and increased penalties will not administer a death blow to
shelters, and if codification of the economic substance doctrine is also not enough, is there some
other, more promising, approach lurking offstage? It is always possible, of course, to shut down
particular shelter techniques by narrowly targeted legislation–as, for example, the enactment of
section 901(k) did for foreign tax credit shelters, the enactment of section 358(h) did for
contingent liability shelters, and the enactment of section 470 did for tax exempt entity leasing.
The problem is that these targeted fixes are always made prospective only. As Congress closes
one loophole, tax shelter designers find other glitches in the Code around which to build new
shelters.28 Like the Dutch boy at the leaky dike, or Hercules attempting to conquer the Hydra by
decapitation, or the man in the gospel parable who is rid of one devil only to be possessed by
“seven devils worse than the first,” or Alice and the Red Queen running as fast as they can just to
stay in the same place–the literary references go on and on–the government cannot win this
game. Some commentators have suggested that ad hoc legislation aimed at particular types of
shelters should be the government’s primary weapon in the battle against shelters.29 We believe,
however, that the always-one-step-behind nature of this approach means it can never be an
adequate response to the proliferation of shelters. As with enhanced disclosure and penalty
regimes, and codification of the economic substance doctrine, we are not opposed to particular
ad hoc prospective legislative responses to tax shelters, but we believe that something more is
needed if the shelter dragon is to be slain.
A Simpler Rule
What is wanted is a silver bullet (or perhaps a broad spectrum antibiotic) which would
kill a wide variety of tax shelters, and do so in such a way that the government would no longer
always be playing “catch up”–a provision which would invalidate tax shelters before they are
invented, and which would leave little to judicial discretion. There is a precedent for such a
bullet. The last tax shelter wars–involving the mass marketing of debt-financed tax shelters to
upper-middle (and even middle-middle) income taxpayers in the 1970s and 1980s–ended
27
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abruptly in a sweeping government victory, as a result of the enactment of the passive loss rules
of section 469 as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. For those (like us) who lived through
those wars, it is natural to hope that some analogue to section 469 might be found, thereby
putting an end to the new breed of shelters in one fell swoop. It is not immediately obvious,
however, how that might be done. The pre-1986 shelters were all very much of a kind–virtually
all involved the creation of artificial (noneconomic) losses for passive investors through the
combination of tax preferences (most commonly accelerated depreciation) and interest expense
deductions. The passive status of the taxpayers investing (so to speak) in the shelters was
crucial, since no busy shelter-seeking doctor or lawyer was willing to devote any significant
portion of his time to the business activities of his shelter. Because of these common shelter
features, it was possible to kill them all with a single bullet–a rule that a taxpayer cannot deduct
losses from an activity in which he does not “materially participate” against income from other
sources (with “material participation” being defined to require, in most cases, at least 500 hours
of the taxpayer’s time per year30). The problem is in translating this success to the new shelters.
Contemporary shelters are considerably more varied in design–and in the Code provisions they
exploit–than were their predecessors.31 Moreover, there is no straightforward way to transport
the elegant simplicity of the 500-hours-per-year participation requirement of section 469 from
the old individual taxpayer shelter context to the new context of shelters used (primarily) by
corporations. Some commentators (including one of us) have expressed a hope that there might
be a workable analogue to section 469 applicable to corporate shelters, but they have not offered
actual proposals.32 However, others–including the Treasury Department during the Clinton
Administration–have believed the enterprise to be hopeless.33
The most promising approach, we think, is to create a hindsight rule, one that emphasizes
outcomes, actual or readily foreseeable, rather than “economic substance” or taxpayer motive. In
that spirit, we propose the enactment of a Code provision that would flatly disallow noneconomic losses and non-economic deferrals through the use of foreign (and other taxindifferent) counterparties. Our aim is to render fruitless the manipulation of basis or other
accounting rules in order to achieve a tax benefit that has no substantial economic corollary, as
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Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1).
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Section 470, the legislative attack on tax exempt entity leasing enacted in 2004, is in
fact closely modeled on section 469. The difference is that section 469 was sufficient to kill
virtually the entire pre-1986 tax shelter industry, whereas section 470 addresses only one
medium-sized corner of the corporate tax shelter phenomenon.
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Lipton et al., Corporate Tax Shelters Roundtable, Taxes, March 2000, at 141, 144;
Zelenak, 54 SMU L. Rev. 177, 191-93 (2001); Sheppard, Is There Constructive Thinking About
Corporate Tax Shelters? 83 Tax Notes 782, 784 (1999).
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Lipton, et al., supra note 36, at 144 (comments of Joseph Mikrut, U.S. Tax Legislative
Counsel); Department of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters: Discussion,
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was attempted in the ACM case.
The rule that we propose is simply stated: (1) no deduction shall be allowed for losses
substantially in excess of any measurable reduction in the taxpayer’s net worth, and (2) no
deduction or exclusion from gross income shall be allowed through the allocation of noneconomic income to a tax-indifferent party (e.g., a foreign bank). Neither “economic substance”
nor “motive to avoid tax” would have any role to play in the application of the proposed
disallowance rules. The rules would operate by resort to arithmetic, not by resort to doctrinal
analysis and not by consulting case-law precedent. Proposed statutory language and
commentary (loosely in the style of a committee report, and relating the proposal to several
recent cases) is included in the Appendix. In contrast with the JCT approach, our proposal takes
the form of a substantive rule that losses within the scope of the proposal are not allowed–not
that the losses are subject (at a court’s discretion) to the economic substance doctrine, and that a
court may disallow the loss if it concludes the transaction lacks economic substance, but rather
that such losses are simply not allowed. This approach avoids both the problem of shelters
escaping because the law gives courts the flexibility to let them escape, and the problem that
narrowly targeted legislative responses are always one step behind the tax shelter industry. We
are sure that the Staff of the Joint Committee fully recognizes the limitations of its own proposal,
and made such a limited proposal because of its sense that Congress would not be amenable, in
the short term, to any more forceful proposal.34 We bow to the Staff’s expertise in taking the
pulse of Congress, but we also claim that our proposal–unlike any of the more frequently
discussed anti-shelter proposals–has the potential to control corporate tax shelters with a level of
effectiveness approaching that of section 469 against pre-1986 shelters.
A virtue (so we hope) of our proposal is that it would – in self-executing fashion –
distinguish between traditional “tax planning” and “planning” that generates abusive tax shelters.
As an example of the former, we need look no further than the famous and well-remembered
Gregory case,35 birthplace of the business purpose doctrine, of which a fact summary appears in
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The Staff of the Joint Committee noted that broad anti-shelter legislation is commonly
opposed on the grounds that “the legislative rule might inadvertently restrict the flexibility of the
courts in resolving disputes on a case-by-base basis,” and that “the rule might apply too broadly,
and cause a court . . . to raise an ‘economic substance’ inquiry in common situations not
previously involving the issue.” Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 6, at 2021. The Staff went on to explain that “[t]he proposal attempts to respond to such concerns by
limiting its application only to certain types of transactions having the characteristics of tax
shelters, and only if a court determines the economic substance doctrine is relevant.” Id.
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Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Mrs. Gregory was the sole owner of
United Mortgage Corporation, which owned highly appreciated investment assets. If she had
caused United Mortgage to distribute the assets to her, the entire fair market value of the assets
would have been taxed to her as a dividend. Instead, she caused United Mortgage to transfer the
appreciated assets to newly-formed Averill Corporation, in exchange for all of Averill’s stock,
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the footnote. Adopting Learned Hand’s classic opinion,36 the Supreme Court held that the
reorganization provisions of the Code include an unwritten “business purpose” requirement, and
that the use of a transitory corporate entity to satisfy the literal requirements of the statute failed
for lack of such a “purpose”. The transaction in Gregory plainly did have an economic goal –
namely, to distribute certain readily salable assets to Mrs. Gregory individually – but not one that
met the business purpose condition which Hand found to be embedded in the Code’s
reorganization provisions. Practitioners are of course well aware that tax plans that build upon
transitory relationships, or “steps,” are vulnerable to attack by the IRS, and that they often fail,
though not always.
At all events, the issue in what we have called a “traditional” context is, roughly
speaking, whether a transaction that has been cast in a roundabout form, with a view to avoiding
the tax that would be imposed if the transaction were carried out directly, will be given legal
recognition or be recast at the Commissioner’s insistence to produce a taxable result. In all such
cases, the taxpayer does indeed have a respectable goal in view – to sell a business, distribute a
dividend or exchange one property for another. The great question, then, is not whether the
taxpayer sought to achieve a bona fide business or investment objective – he plainly did -- but
whether the roundabout form adopted by his tax planners is legally valid and creditable under the
statute. By and large, the outcome depends on whether the form chosen has substantive effect in
all its elements or, instead, includes some transitory feature whose only function is to meet the
terms of the statute in literal fashion.
Gregory is an instance of traditional “tax planning” – a failed instance, to be sure – but it
obviously does not come within the class of tax shelters that would be affected by our
disallowance proposal -- provided, as we intend, that the term “tax shelter” is understood to
mean the creation of noneconomic tax benefits of the sort claimed in the ACM case. Traditional
tax planning is most often aimed at avoiding the recognition of taxable gain or ordinary income.
Our aim is to place that settled function of advice-giving to one side. Doctrinal limitations –
“business purpose,” “step transaction” – would continue to apply, however variably, where
appropriate, but the Gregory case and its infinite progeny would fall outside the scope of our

and then to distribute all the Averill stock to her. Shortly after receiving the Averill stock, Mrs.
Gregory obtained direct ownership of the appreciated assets through the complete liquidation of
Averill. She then sold the assets. The transaction met the literal statutory requirements for a
divisive corporate reorganization. If the form of the transaction were respected, Mrs. Gregory
would have been able to recover a portion of her basis in her United Mortgage stock, and would
have paid tax on her gain at favorable capital gains rates. After the dust had settled, however,
the non-tax result of the series of transactions was indistinguishable from that of a simple
dividend distribution of the appreciated assets from United Mortgage to Mrs. Gregory (followed
by a sale of those assets by Mrs. Gregory), and the Supreme Court held that the transaction
should be taxed according to its dividend substance, rather than its reorganization form.
36

Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).
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disallowance rule. We therefore follow the JCT proposal in vesting in the Secretary specific
authority to regulate, and thus to distinguish between shelter transactions – those that entail
noneconomic losses and transactions with foreign counterparties – and transactions that may be
regarded as a function (whether or not acceptable to the Commissioner) of traditional tax
planning. As noted above, the JCT proposal imposes its “economic substance” condition on the
taxpayer only if, as an initial matter, a court determines that the economic substance “doctrine” is
relevant to the case at hand. That curious threshold feature (we assume, perhaps wrongly) is
designed to prompt the court to distinguish between traditional tax planning and abusive shelter
planning. If so, it goes well past its purpose, creating uncertainty where there should be none
and leaving the shelter-planner free to pump just enough economic substance into his scheme to
avoid the provision altogether.
Alternatives
We anticipate two principal objections to our proposal. The first is that as a rule of
substantive law it would apply too broadly–that is, it would disallow noneconomic losses (and
deductions and exclusions)37 in situations where Congress, if it had considered the issue, would
have considered the losses appropriately allowed. The second (and closely related) objection is
that it would inhibit legitimate business planning by creating massive uncertainty as to its scope.
We agree that Congress would not want to disallow every type of noneconomic loss, and that
some mechanism is needed to separate the deductible wheat from the nondeductible chaff. Two
basic mechanisms for accomplishing this come to mind, and we would be satisfied with either.
The first mechanism, which is reflected in the proposed statutory language in the
Appendix, is to enact a self-executing disallowance provision–i.e., a provision which by its own
terms disallows described losses, without the need for any implementing regulations or other
administrative action–but to provide for appropriate exceptions. The statutory language we have
proposed would leave the crafting of exceptions to Treasury, but we would not object to more
direct legislative involvement in this area, which could take either or both of two forms. The
first would be a general statement that the disallowance provision does not apply to
noneconomic losses “clearly contemplated” by Congress.38 This could be combined with an
explicit grant of regulatory authority to promulgate a nonexclusive list of situations to which the
“clearly contemplated” exception applies. Instead of, or in addition to, a general “clearly
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The remainder of this discussion uses “noneconomic losses” as a shorthand covering
both noneconomic losses and noneconomic deductions and exclusions in transactions with taxindifferent parties.
38

To take two easy examples familiar to every law student who has taken the basic
income tax course, the noneconomic loss created by the combination of tax-free imputed rental
income and deductible home mortgage interest (see IRC § 163(h)(3)) is clearly contemplated by
Congress, as is the charitable contribution deduction for appreciation never taxed to the donor
(see IRC § 170(e)).
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contemplated” provision, Congress could include in the statute (or perhaps in the legislative
history) a list of situations in which noneconomic losses are not subject to disallowance.
Although we ourselves would not undertake the daunting task of compiling such a list, we are
confident that lobbyists would propose to the tax-writing committees every worthy candidate for
inclusion. In fact, the main danger of a statutory list of exceptions is that lobbyists would
persuade Congress to include inappropriate items on the list.
The second mechanism for separating the deductible wheat from the disallowed chaff
would be the enactment of a non-self-executing anti-shelter provision. Rather than disallowing
any noneconomic losses by its own terms, a statute of this sort would confer on the Treasury the
authority to promulgate regulations disallowing any noneconomic losses (or deductions or
exclusions arising in connection with transactions with tax indifferent parties) as necessary to
prevent abuse. This reverses the presumption of the first mechanism. Under the first approach,
all noneconomic losses are disallowed except as otherwise provided; under the second approach,
noneconomic losses are disallowed only as specifically provided. If Congress were concerned
that Treasury might be overly exuberant in its exercise of this authority, it could subject it to
either or both of the limitations discussed in connection with the first mechanism–it could deny
Treasury authority to disallow losses “clearly contemplated” by Congress, losses on a list of
exceptions, or both. Since anti-shelter legislation will be effective only if it overcomes the
always-one-step-behind problem, this approach would be effective only if it gave Treasury
authority to apply its anti-shelter regulations retroactively.39 It should be sufficient to authorize
retroactivity to the date of the enactment of the legislation conferring the regulatory authority.
With this regulatory authority in place, any taxpayer considering a tax shelter would have to take
into account the possibility that it would be invalidated by regulations promulgated after the
taxpayer had entered into the shelter. Moreover, the threat of retroactive invalidation would
make it impossible for attorneys to issue favorable shelter opinion letters. If Treasury considered
this Damoclean threat inappropriate with respect to particular transactions, it could promulgate
regulations (or simply issue announcements) identifying situations in which it had decided it
would definitely not issue loss disallowance regulations.
Only time will determine the political viability of a grant of retroactive regulatory antishelter authority, but a 1999 Report of the Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association
(NYSBA) suggests that the elite tax bar, at least, might accept this approach to the shelter
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Assuming Congress is willing to legislate broadly against tax shelters, we would not
expect it to balk at granting Treasury authority to promulgate retroactive anti-shelter regulations.
Despite its general antipathy to retroactive tax regulations, Congress currently permits tax
regulations to “take effect or apply retroactively to prevent abuse.” IRC § 7805(b)(3). Under
current law this would include, for example, regulations promulgated under IRC § 337(d)
(authorizing regulations to ensure that General Utilities repeal is not circumvented), and IRC §
7701(l) (authorizing regulations to “prevent avoidance of any tax” through the use of multipleparty financing arrangements).
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problem.40 The Report was written in response to a set of anti-shelter proposals offered by the
Clinton Treasury Department, including a proposal that Treasury be given authority exercisable
on a case-by-case basis “to disallow a deduction, credit, exclusion or other allowance obtained in
a tax avoidance transaction.”41 The NYSBA Tax Section strongly objected to this proposal,
expressing concerns that the authority would be exercised by individual IRS officials “without
substantial guidance or control,” and that positions taken by the IRS under this provision might
be “substantially out of step with the views of Congress” because of the ability of the IRS to
apply the provision “without the exercise of regulation authority subject to public comment.”42
By contrast, the Tax Section suggested that “a general grant of regulatory authority . . . to
address transactions that exploit obvious loopholes that are plainly contrary to the intention or
contemplation of Congress” could be “usefully considered.”43 The Tax Section considered this
approach superior to the Treasury’s proposal because the notice and comment requirement for
regulations would “constrain the arbitrary exercise of this authority.”44
No doubt a grant of regulatory authority of this sort would be challenged on
constitutional grounds, both for its broad scope and for its retroactive effect. Although we leave
a detailed discussion of the constitutional issue for another day, a quick review of the authorities
suggest the grant would survive all constitutional challenges. The nondelegation doctrine would
be the basis of a challenge based on the sweeping nature of the regulatory grant; the argument
would be that the grant is “an unconstitutional delegation of the taxing power by Congress to the
Executive Branch.”45 The leading case on the application of the nondelegation doctrine in the
tax arena is Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., in which a taxpayer challenged a statutory
grant of authority to the Secretary of Transportation to establish a schedule of “Pipeline safety
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Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association, Comments on the Administration’s
Corporate Tax Shelter Proposals, 83 Tax Notes 879 (1999).
41

Department of the Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Revenue
Proposals 98 (Feb. 1999).
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Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association, supra note 44, at 898.
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Id. at 900. The Tax Section did not specify whether the contemplated authority would
include authority to make the regulations retroactive, but the overall context of the Report
strongly suggests that retroactivity was contemplated. Elsewhere in the Report the Tax Section
described at some length the always-one-step-behind problem inherent in most of the existing
approaches to combating shelters (id. at 882-84), and opined that retroactive regulations are
sometimes appropriate under more targeted grants of authority to promulgate anti-abuse
regulations (id. at 880).
44

Id.
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Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 214 (1989).
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user fees,” which gave the Secretary broad discretion in setting the fee schedule.46 The Supreme
Court began by noting that the nondelegation doctrine is ordinarily not very demanding, as
illustrated by earlier cases such as one upholding a grant to a Price Administrator to set “fair and
equitable” commodities prices,47 and another upholding a grant of authority to the Federal
Communications Commission to regulate broadcast licensing according to “public interest,
convenience, or necessity.”48 In general, noted the Court, it is enough that “Congress provides an
administrative agency with standards guiding its actions such that a court could ‘“ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.”’”49 Mid-America Pipeline Co. argued, however,
that the “user fees” were really taxes, and that a more demanding version of the nondelegation
doctrine applied to taxation. A unanimous Supreme Court sharply disagreed: “Even if the user
fees are a form of taxation, we hold that the delegation of discretionary authority under
Congress’ taxing power is subject to no constitutional scrutiny greater than that we have applied
to other nondelegation challenges.”50 The Court concluded that the delegation to set user fees did
not violate the Constitution, even if viewed as a delegation of the power to tax. Under the
approach to the nondelegation doctrine used by the Court in Skinner, the proposed grant of antishelter regulatory authority seems clearly permissible.
The second constitutional issue is whether retroactive application of anti-shelter
regulations might be invalid as an abuse of discretion or as a violation of the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. (Although some courts analyze this issue in abuse of discretion terms,
and some in due process terms, the choice of label seems to have no effect on the substance of
the analysis.51) The dominant view is that retroactivity is a grounds for judicial invalidation only
if the “regulation alters settled prior law or policy upon which the taxpayer justifiably relied and
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The statute directed the Secretary to “establish a schedule of fees based on the usage, in
reasonable relationship to volume-miles, miles, revenues, or an appropriate combination thereof,
of natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines.” 490 U.S. at 214, quoting the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82, –, sec. 7005(a)(1).
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Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 426-27 (1944).
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National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194, 225-26 (1943).
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490 U.S. at 219, quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989), in turn
quoting Yakus v. United States, 312 U.S. 414, 426 (1944).
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See, e.g., Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87 F.3d 99(3d Cir. 1996) (due process
analysis); Snap Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996) (abuse of discretion
analysis, but relying heavily upon Supreme Court due process precedent); A. Tarricone, Inc. v.
United States, 4 F.Supp. 2d 323 (SDNY 1998) (invoking both abuse of discretion and due
process terminology); CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 755 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986) (abuse of discretion analysis).
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if the change causes the taxpayer to suffer inordinate harm.”52 Applying this standard to uphold
the application to events of 1985 of regulations issued in 1992, the Third Circuit stated that it
was sufficient that “the taxpayer had adequate notice within a reasonable time [by October of
1986] that regulations would be forthcoming which could alter the tax treatment of its interest
deductions.”53 Similarly, the Southern District of New York upheld the retroactive application
of an excise tax regulation where the law was unsettled prior to the issuance of the regulations:
“[Taxpayer] cannot plausibly contend that the retroactive application of the new regulations
altered settled law and expectations; to the contrary, it was always possible that [taxpayer] would
be liable for the taxes at issue here.”54 Any taxpayer entering into a tax shelter transaction
featuring a noneconomic loss (or involving a tax-indifferent party) after the enactment of the
grant to Treasury of regulatory anti-shelter authority would be on notice that the hoped-for tax
benefits were subject to retroactive disallowance by regulation. To any claim of abuse of
discretion or due process violation, Treasury could simply respond that the taxpayer always
knew (or should have known) that “it was always possible” that the tax benefits would be
retroactively disallowed, and that should be enough to uphold the retroactive application of the
regulation.55
It is our sense that not a great deal is at stake in the choice between these two approaches
to separating the wheat from the chaff. Under either approach, there will be a period when the
scope of the anti-shelter provision is less than perfectly clear–in one case because the exceptions
to the self-executing rule have not yet been fully defined, and in the other case because the
Treasury has not yet fully indicated how aggressively it will exercise its authority to disallow
52

CWT Farms, Inc., 755 F.2d at 802.
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Tate & Lyle, 87 F.3d at 107-08 (emphasis added).
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A. Tarricone, Inc., 4 F.Supp.2d, at 326.
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There is authority, from the Fifth Circuit, indicating that a regulation retroactive to the
enactment of the authorizing statute would survive due process and abuse of discretion challenge
even in the presence of justified detrimental reliance. Snap Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra
note 55. On the authority of United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994) (upholding against a
due process challenge the retroactive application of an estate tax statutory provision), the Fifth
Circuit applied a rational purpose standard. It held that matching the effective date of the
retroactive regulation to the effective date of the statute to which it related was enough to satisfy
the rationale purpose standard, despite the fact that the taxpayer reasonably relied on the
existence of a contrary state of the law and the fact that the court considered retroactive
application of the regulation to the taxpayer to be “inordinately harsh.” Snap Drape, Inc., 98
F.3d at 203. The validity of retroactive regulations under the proposed anti-shelter legislation
does not depend, however, on the Snap Drape analysis. Even assuming that due process and
abuse of discretion analyses do protect reasonable reliance, taxpayers entering into tax shelters
after the enactment of the legislation could not establish that they had reasonably assumed that
retroactive anti-shelter regulations would not be applied to them.
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losses retroactively. Under either approach, however, we would expect the uncertainty to
dissipate fairly quickly, as Treasury issued additional guidance over time. To deal with the
predictable complaints that either approach would introduce an unacceptably high level of
uncertainty (at least in the short term), thus interfering with legitimate tax planning, Congress
might accompany either approach with funding for an expanded advance ruling program. Any
taxpayer contemplating a tax shelter investment could request an advance ruling that the hopedfor tax benefit was within the “clearly contemplated” exception (under the self-executing form of
the proposal) or that it would not be retroactively disallowed (under the regulatory authority
form of the proposal). If this approach–of providing predictability on a case-by-case basis
through the advance ruling process–has proven generally satisfactory for corporate
reorganizations, it should also be generally satisfactory for tax shelters. In reality, of course, this
approach would call the bluff of those who complain about uncertainty but whose real interest is
in being able to play the audit lottery without risk of penalty.
A final comment on two things our proposal does not do. First, the proposal does not
address Cottage Savings-type situations, in which the taxpayer has clearly suffered an economic
loss, and the question is whether events have occurred which make it appropriate to take that loss
into account for tax purposes.56 If these situations are understood as tax shelters at all,57 they are
a tiny part of the tax shelter universe, and excluding them from the scope of our proposal does
not significantly reduce its effectiveness. Second, the noneconomic loss portion of the proposal
would not reach a transaction in which the taxpayer manages to “stuff” enough taxable income
into the transaction to avoid the generation of a tax loss. Suppose, for example, a taxpayer’s
original shelter plan was a transaction which generated zero economic income and a $1 million
noneconomic tax loss. This plan would be subject to our proposal. But if the taxpayer were able
to stuff into the same transaction $1 million of income (i.e., $1 million of both economic income
and taxable income), the overall transaction would then feature $1 million of economic income
and zero taxable income. It could still be reasonably described as a shelter, but it would no
longer feature a noneconomic loss, and so would not be subject to the first prong of our proposal.
The proposal could be amended, of course, to extend to all transactions in which taxable income
is lower than economic income, but that would put a huge number of transactions–perhaps a
majority of all transactions–within the scope of the proposal. Among other things, expanding the
proposal in this manner would raise the specter of a general imposition of tax on unrealized
appreciation. Although we are concerned that the narrower scope of our proposal may leave
room for some shelters to escape its reach, on balance we think the proposal would be
reasonably effective, for two reasons. First, although some shelter-like transactions have
avoided the production of losses through the income-stuffing technique, they have generally
required the presence of tax-indifferent parties.58 Thus, they would escape the first prong of our
56

Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991).

57

See Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association, supra note 44, at 886-88
(expressing doubt that transactions of this type should be understood as tax shelters).
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See, e.g., TIFD III-E, supra note 1.
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proposal only to be impaled on the second prong. Second, in many cases the problem of stuffing
can be dealt with through appropriate determinations of the “transaction” to which the antishelter legislation applies. That is, if the taxpayer has no good non-tax reason for stuffing the
income into the shelter transaction, then the transaction can and should be defined by excluding
the stuffed income from its scope, with the result that the transaction produces a noneconomic
loss after all.59
Conclusion
For the reasons we have given, the ‘economic substance’ doctrine is simply too weak a
barrier to protect the income tax from assault by abusive shelter planners. Recent court decisions
prove that proposition beyond a doubt. New statutory disclosure rules and ethical practice
restrictions are all to the good, but they do not bear directly on the legal question of what is and
what is not acceptable tax planning. The JCT proposal is to be admired, as we have said, but its
invocation of judicial discretion in determining whether the doctrine is or is not relevant in a
given case is a serious, perhaps even a fatal weakness. Patchwork legislation aimed at particular
shelter schemes is also to the good, but it is normally prospective in application, leaving those
who have already taken steroids to enjoy their homerun records, even if sometimes contested,
and of course having no application to new shelter ideas as they arise.
Our proposal discards ‘doctrine’ and strikes at abusive shelters in a direct fashion by
stressing outcomes rather than intentions. The tax benefit sought by the shelter planner is simply
made unavailable. If adopted, our proposal should make it impossible for law firms to issue
favorable opinions on shelter schemes that would entail tax benefits in excess of economic loss,
and should also put an end to shelter litigation.

Appendix
We propose a Code amendment in the following form:
Section XXX. Noneconomic losses and deferrals
(a) Noneconomic losses and deferrals.
(1) Noneconomic losses. No deduction shall be allowed for any loss claimed to have
been incurred in connection with any transaction or series of transactions except to the
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This defining of the scope of a transaction can be done by the IRS and the courts on a
case-by-case basis, but it would also be an appropriate topic for regulations, as Treasury is able
to identify particular genres of income-stuffing transactions.
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extent that such loss reflects a measurable reduction in the taxpayer=s net worth.
(2) Tax-indifferent parties. No deduction or exclusion from gross income shall be
allowed in connection with any transaction or series of transactions structured to result in
income to a tax-indifferent party for any period, which income is substantially in excess
of the economic income of such tax-indifferent party for such period. The term “taxindifferent party” means any person or entity not subject to tax imposed by subtitle A. A
person shall be treated as a tax-indifferent party with respect to a transaction if the items
taken into account with respect to a transaction have no substantial impact on such
person’s liability under subtitle A.
(b) The Secretary may by regulations exempt any transaction from the application of this
Section.

Commentary:
(a)(1) Noneconomic losses. No deduction shall be allowed for any loss claimed to have
been incurred in connection with any transaction or series of transactions except to the extent
that such loss reflects a measurable reduction in the taxpayer’s net worth.
The ACM transaction is an example of the kind of shelter-device this provision is
intended to eliminate.60 Another example – this one a notable taxpayer triumph – is provided by
the District Court’s ill-advised decision in Black & Decker Corp. v. U.S.61 Black & Decker,
having realized significant capital gains on the earlier sale of various properties, was in the
market for offsetting capital losses. As proposed and planned by its accounting firm, Black &
Decker created a wholly owned subsidiary to which it transferred (i) $560 million in contingent
employee healthcare claims plus (ii) $561 million in cold hard cash. It then sold the stock of the
subsidiary to an “independent” third party for $1 million. Asserting that its basis in the
subsidiary’s stock was equal to the cash transferred, $561 million, Black & Decker sought to
deduct a $560 million capital loss. The Commissioner, arguing that Black & Decker’s basis for
the stock should be reduced to $1 million by reason of the subsidiary’s assumption of the
contingent healthcare claims, disallowed the loss in full.
The Court held for the taxpayer. In general, IRC § 358(d) provides that the basis of stock
received in a tax-free incorporation under IRC § 351(a) shall be reduced by the amount of any
liability assumed by the corporate transferee. If applicable, the provision just cited would, as the
government contended, result in a $1 million basis for the subsidiary’s stock in the hands of

60

ACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1017 (1999). ACM is described in some detail, infra text accompanying notes 8 - 13.
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Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 340 F.Supp.2d 621 (ND Md. 2004).
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Black & Decker and, of course, no deductible loss when the stock was sold. For reasons too
tedious to describe, the Court allowed itself to be persuaded that § 358(d) did not apply to
contingent liabilities that would be deductible by the transferor if paid in the ordinary course of
the transferor’s business, as would be true of the employee healthcare claims. Accordingly, it
found that the taxpayer’s stock basis was equal to the cash transferred, $561 million, unreduced
by the $560 million of liabilities assumed by the transferee-subsidiary.
The decision is of course preposterous. As a matter of tax logic, the basis of stock
received in a § 351 incorporation cannot exceed the value of that stock – $1 million in Black &
Decker -- unless the value of the property transferred had declined in the hands of the transferor
prior to the transfer. In the latter circumstance, the loss in value relative to the transferor’s basis
is properly recognized on a sale of the stock just as it would be on a sale of the property itself.
But there was no such loss in value in Black & Decker; the cash transferred was
obviously worth its face amount. The “loss” claimed by the taxpayer had no economic corollary
but simply represented an unaccrued expense for which the taxpayer had received full value in
the form of employee services. The Court proceeded blindly to apply the relevant Code
provisions and in the end rewarded the taxpayer with an enormous undeserved tax benefit,
leaving Congress to supply a legislative remedy.62
Subsection (a)(1) of our proposal would knock out the Black & Decker shelter by
restricting loss deductions to transactions by which a measurable reduction of taxpayer net worth
is shown to have been realized. Other shelter devices that depend on artificial basis
manipulation would likewise be eliminated. Lease-stripping transactions63, offsetting straddles64
and currency options65, distributions of encumbered property66 – all the subject of recent revenue
rulings – would be rendered fruitless by subsection (a)(1) for the straightforward reason that
none of these devices generates a measurable reduction in the taxpayer’s net worth. Questions of
“economic substance” or “taxpayer motive” would be irrelevant.
(a)(2) Tax-indifferent parties. No deduction or exclusion from gross income shall be
allowed in connection with any transaction or series of transactions structured to result in
62

Section 358(h), which was added to the Code in 2000, clearly forecloses the possibility
of successful Black & Decker-type shelters in the future. That provision did not exist, however,
at the time of the Black & Decker transaction, and it was not made retroactively effective
(following the usual practice with respect to ad hoc legislative responses to tax shelters).
63

Notice 2003-55, 2003-2 CB 395.

64

. Notice 2002-65, 2002-2 CB 690.

65

. Notice 2000-44, 2 CB 255.

66

. Notice 99-59, 1999-2 CB 761.
23

income to a tax-indifferent party for any period, which income is substantially in excess of the
economic income of such tax-indifferent party for such period. The term “tax-indifferent party”
means any person or entity not subject to tax imposed by subtitle A. A person shall be treated as
a tax-indifferent party with respect to a transaction if the items taken into account with respect
to a transaction have no substantial impact on such person’s liability under subtitle A.
The recently decided TIFD III-E case (better known as Castle Harbour) provides a
suitable illustration.67 In Castle Harbour, the taxpayer, General Electric Credit Corporation,
transferred leased aircraft with a value of $272 million to a newly formed partnership, Castle
Harbour, LLC. The other partners, which transferred $117 million of cash to the partnership,
were a group of Dutch banks not subject to U.S. taxation. The aircraft had presumably been
fully depreciated before the transfer. Exploiting the partnership allocation rules, the partnership
agreement provided that 98% of the taxable income realized annually under the aircraft leases
was to be allocated to the Dutch banks, just 2% to GECC. The banks, however, were entitled to
annual distributions of net book income only – that is, gross rentals less book depreciation, the
latter amount being derived from the value of the aircraft at date of transfer ($272 million) rather
than the basis of the aircraft in the hands of GECC, which presumably was zero. In the end the
banks would get back their original cash investment of $117 million plus a pre-calculated 9.1%
return.
The effect of all this was to enable GECC to avoid an enormous tax burden – roughly $62
million -- while shifting very little book income to the banks. “Put another way,” said the Court,
“by [actually paying out] income less depreciation to tax-neutral parties, GECC was able to ‘redepreciate’ the [aircraft] for tax purposes. The tax-neutrals absorbed the tax consequences of all
the income allocated to them, but actually received only the income in excess of book
depreciation. Thus, the full amount of book depreciation was available, pre-tax, to Castle
Harbour [GECC, in effect] to use” in financing other business activities. Put yet another way,
GECC obtained an interest-free loan from the United States Treasury in the amount of $62
million, which was not a bad day’s work.
It is of course perfectly obvious that the annual distributions to the Dutch banks were
simply a return of the banks’ capital investment in the partnership (plus 9.1% interest), although
characterized as “income” under the partnership agreement . The banks were creditors in all but
name, and the annual distribution of book income was nothing more than a “fast-pay”
repayment of debt plus interest. Nevertheless, finding that the partnership had “economic
substance” and that the banks took some risk, however modest, the District Court held for the
taxpayer. The Court very well understood that the partnership enabled GECC to enjoy a massive
tax saving, but it saw, or thought it saw, substantial non-tax advantages as well and in the end
concluded that the scheme was “legally permissible” – at least until Congress should legislate
otherwise.
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Subsection (a)(2) of our proposed statute, which is drawn directly from the Joint
Committee proposal, would put an end to Castle Harbour-type tax shelters by denying the
domestic taxpayer, GECC, an exclusion for the excess of the “taxable income” annually
allocated to the banks by the partnership agreement over the “book income” actually received.
The effect would be to treat what the Court in Castle Harbour properly called “re-depreciation”
as taxable to the domestic partner.
Subsection (a)(2) may overlap (a)(1) where there is both basis manipulation and a
cooperating foreign counterparty – the currency option device mentioned above would be an
instance – but the overlap would in every case be harmless. Once again, “economic substance”
would be irrelevant under subsection (a)(2).
*
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